11th Marines OIF I
Into Baghdad and on to Tikrit
5 April 2003 – THE BLUE DIAMOND PREPARES TO KICK OPEN THE DOOR TO BAGHDAD
On 5 April 2003 the 1st Marine Division was on the outskirts of Baghdad preparing for the final assault on the city. After advancing over 500 kilometers through Iraq and crossing two major rivers, the Diyala River on the southeastern border of Baghdad was the final obstacle the Division had to cross to enter the city.
The Division’s three pronged operation plan called for the 7th Marines and 1st Marines to enter the city from the east at two bridge sites. 1st Marines would also conduct an amphibious assault across the river in Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs). The 5th Marines would swing around the eastern side of Baghdad and then attack into the city from the northeast.
The Cannon Cockers remained busy with fires designed to destroy enemy positions that posed a threat to the attack into the city and shielding the Marines and sailors of the Division from the enemy indirect fire threat. As noted in the Division official history:
“As would be the case for the next five days, most units on the east side of the Diyala received sporadic mortar and artillery fire in and around their positions. The enemy indirect fire was inaccurate, and Marines quickly assumed a degree of nonchalance on hearing the sound of explosions. In fact, Marines were more likely to jump at the sound of the Division’s own guns, as 11th Marines attacked enemy firing units located by counter-battery radar with a vengeance.”
“Pushing fires across to the west side of the Diyala River, the Division worked to reduce the risk to RCT-7 in a shaping effort against Regime forces in the Rasheed military complex. The Rasheed area had been a suspected chemical weapons storage site, and was known to house a number of Regime helicopters at its airfield. Division Fires and the 11th Marines took it as their special mission to reduce this pocket of capability, and to eliminate the threat potentially posed by a Regime helicopter loaded with chemical munitions. From both the Division Forward and then the Division Main CPs, Division drove B-52, F/A-18, AH-1W, DPICM, and HE artillery missions against the enemy equipment and facilities observed at the airfield and scattered throughout the huge Rasheed military complex. The shaping fires were ultimately effective, and the Rasheed complex offered little resistance when uncovered two days later.” With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003
The intensive fires that the Cannon Cockers had delivered in supporting the Division’s advance on Baghdad put a dent in the Regiment’s on-hand ammunition inventory. Once again the 11th Marines attacked the issue in a proactive manner by downloading the Regiment’s logistics trains and making the long drive south to retrieve critically needed artillery ammunition that could not be pushed to the Regiment by the supporting logistics effort.
To many of the Cannon Cockers the highlight of the day was the downgrading of the Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) status from MOPP-2 to MOPP-1. After 17 days, the hated rubber overshoes were ditched.
6 APRIL 2003 – PLANNING FOR THE FINAL ASSAULT INTO BAGHAD
The 1st Marine Division continued its planning for crossing the Diyala River while the Cannon Cockers continued to shield the Division from enemy indirect fire systems attempting to engage the Division from within the city.
The Division history recorded the challenges faced with finding a route across the Diyala and the 11th Marines' ongoing counterfire effort:
“The north-south running Diyala River now stood between the Division and Baghdad proper. The ineffective outer defensive cordon of Baghdad had been defeated. Compared to the crossing of the Euphrates or the Tigris, the Diyala crossing had received less planning attention. Both of the bridges over the Diyala in the south of the Division’s zone remained intact. By the plan, these southern bridges would support an RCT-7 fixing attack, while RCT-5 would swing wide and attack into the vicinity of Saddam City. RCT-5 began its reconnaissance up the Diyala to the north in order to find a suitable crossing site that would support its attack. Crossing the river there would allow RCT-5 to extend the cordon around Baghdad to the north. That morning, the Division and 8th ESB planners reviewed the data on the Diyala River, and ‘flew’ over sections of it on the Falconview 3D terrain visualization system. A number of sites appeared to offer relatively easy crossing of the river, and the Engineers worked their way north to check each of them first hand. By this time, the Iraqis had also figured out that the Americans were looking to envelop Baghdad to the north, and the Marines soon found themselves receiving mortar fire along the banks of the river.
Later that afternoon, the Division engineer was sent forward to assess the supportability of a Division crossing. The Iraqis had made an attempt to destroy both of the bridges crossing the Diyala Canal. The engineers discovered that the southern bridge had an entire span blown out. The bridge was damaged beyond repair, and the damage was too wide to span with an AVLB. At the northern site, the Iraqis had blown a hole in the far span of the bridge, and the entire western end of the bridge was sagging. It would require a detailed engineer assessment, but neither crossing looked good. With the engineer reconnaissance that RCT-5 had conducted also coming up empty, the Division had gone from three planned crossings to zero in 24 hours. The Division had crossed oceans and deserts to get to Iraq, had come nearly 500 km into Iraq over two ‘big name’ rivers, and was now challenged by a ribbon of water that most barely knew the name of.
As the Division worked to establish its cordon around the city, the 11th Marines continued to provide extensive counterbattery fires against Iraqi artillery firing from within the open areas of the city (stadiums, racetracks, roadways, military complexes) often co-located near noncombatants. In order to minimize collateral damage to noncombatants and civilian infrastructure, many of the radar-acquired targets were passed exclusively to aviation for engagement with precision munitions using the ‘quickfire’ procedures the Division had practiced back in Camp Pendleton. All targets were vetted with high-resolution imagery to check for potential collateral damage prior to conducting counterfire missions. Artillery targets became fewer and fewer as the 11th Marines gained fires dominance over any would-be Iraqi indirect fire capability.”
7 APRIL 2003 – THE BLUE DIAMOND ENTERS BAGHDAD
On 7 April the 1st Marine Division crossed the final barrier to Baghdad, the Diyala River. The Division conducted a three pronged assault with 7th Marines seizing two damaged bridges facilitated by Division Engineers clearing minefields and repairing the damaged spans to support heavy vehicles. Further north the 1st Marines conducted an amphibious assault across the Diyala River, while 5th Marines made an end run to the complete the cordon around the eastern half of Baghad.
The 11th Marines provided supporting fires to cover both river crossing sites while simultaneously engaging the increasingly weak enemy indirect fire’s dying gasps.
The 7th and 1st Marines expanded their bridgeheads and 1st Marine Division began to flow into the city. With the city's defenses breached, Iraqi resistance began to collapse and the final writing was on the wall for Saddam’s regime.
10 APRIL 2003 – THE CANNON COCKERS TAKE THE LEAD ON CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EAST BAGHDAD
On 10 April armed resistance in Baghdad came to an end and the 1st Marine Division immediately shifted to post hostility operations in the city. The Cannon Cockers were assigned the lead for Civil–Military Operations based on the unique capabilities the Regiment possessed. With 60% of the Division’s rolling stock, 30% of the Division’s engineer assets, and an in-place fires network that spanned down to ever maneuver company in the Division, the Cannon Cockers were ideally suited for this mission. While Civil-Military Operations became the main effort in Baghdad, the Regiment simultaneously began planning to support follow-on operations to Tikrit. 5/11 was tasked with supporting the Division’s upcoming follow-on mission and additional target acquisition support was attached to the Battalion to facilitate its ability to conduct independent operations.
The Cannon Cocker’s would ably perform the Civil-Military Operations mission in East Baghdad for the next ten days.
As captured in the Division’s official history:
“The rapidity and violence of the Division attack on the city, coupled with the firepower brought to bear by 3d MAW and 11th Marines, had crushed the enemy’s ability to resist.”
“Upon entering Baghdad, 11th Marines was given two additional tasks that are not typically assigned to an artillery regiment; to establish its own sector for security operations, and to man and operate the 1st Marine Division Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC). The 11th Marines approached these new tasks with the same gusto and professionalism that they had when providing artillery support for the last 22 days. The regimental headquarters immediately established two command posts, one in the 11th Marine's sector (for security and stabilization operations) and a second at the Palestine Hotel in downtown Baghdad (where the CMOC would operate.) At the CMOC, 11th Marines began building on the excellent groundwork laid by RCT-7.
In their sector, the regiment’s task was to restore order and help ease the suffering. Within 24 hours the sector around Rasheed was greatly improved. Both 1/11 and 3/11 worked throughout the community conducting patrols, removing weapons caches, detaining looters, and showing the Iraqi people that Americans were not conquerors, but liberators. Through it all, 11th Marines maintained a firing capability to support counterbattery missions and calls for fire anywhere in the city.
The 11th Marines Commanding Officer was assigned as the Civil-Military Operations Coordinator for the 1st Marine Division, and the 11th Marines set the tone for accomplishing the daunting challenges in Baghdad. Through daily meetings with the RCT commanders, the 3d Civil Affairs Group liaison detachment, civic leaders, non-governmental organizations, and former Iraqi government officials, the 11th Marines organized the CMOC into functional departments to focus the humanitarian efforts throughout the 1st Marine Division’s area of responsibility. Each day the CMOC accomplished more, achieving small 'victories' to improve the situation in Baghdad.” With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003.
12 April 2003 – 5/11 SUPPORTS TASK FORCE TRIPOLI’S ATTACK TO TIKRIT
With Baghdad increasingly secure from conventional threats, the Coalition had gained all of its military objectives in southern Iraq. On 10 April, the Combined Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC) tasked I MEF to send a task force to secure the Kirkuk oilfields, 200 km to the north of Baghdad. The mission was passed to 1st Marine Division, who formed an LAR-based task force under the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General John Kelly. Task Force Tripoli was formed and completed planning for an attack to the northern Kirkuk Oilfields. The following day, however, Kurdish forces, aided by US Special Forces and the US 173d Airborne Brigade, broke through the Iraqi defenses in the north and captured Kirkuk. With the Kirkuk oilfields in allied hands, the Coalition’s attention turned to the last remaining holdout for Saddam Hussein’s Regime, the northern city of Tikrit. CFLCC again turned to the 1st Marine Division to accomplish the task of taking this important objective. For the Division, the mission and timing for an attack north remained the same, but the objective became Tikrit instead of Kirkuk. With a requirement to move out later that same day, Task Force Tripoli completed its preparations without delay.
Task Force Tripoli took its name from the Marines’ 1805 exploits against the pirates of the Mediterranean Barbary coast, which also included a long approach march through the desert against its objectives. Now, a set of modern-day pirates in northern Iraq required similar rough handling. In fact, Task Force Tripoli would be operating much closer to the Mediterranean Sea than the Arabian Gulf for most of its mission. As they set out on this long distance mission, the Marines of Task Force Tripoli intended to create the makings of another verse to the revered Marine Corps hymn. Now set in modern times, this operation would further demonstrate the reach of America’s Marines operating from the sea.
Tikrit was Saddam’s hometown, under the control of his Tikrit tribesmen and allies. During Saddam's rise to power, it had been a wellspring of support. With less than 12 hours notice, Blue Diamond redirected its Task Force Tripoli to seizing this last Regime stronghold, removing it as a possible place of refuge for Regime leadership, and eliminating it as a source of instability. The Task Force commander gave his planning guidance to the Task Force Tripoli Operations Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Sinclair, the Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Groen, and the Fire Support Coordinator, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Smythe (USA). In less than 12 hours, the staff had developed a mission, routes, scheme of maneuver, and tactical objectives in the Tikrit area. By the evening of 11 April, Task Force Tripoli was prepared to launch its attack. The lead elements of the Task Force, including the Division Forward CP, began the march to the Tactical Assembly Area north of Baghdad. As the sun descended on the evening of 11 April, the Marines of Task Force Tripoli experienced an auspicious beginning to their mission. Passing north through the crowded streets of mostly Shia eastern Baghdad, the column was heralded with waves, shouts, smiles, and kisses from the newly liberated Iraqi people. The people lined the streets and continued to wave until it was too dark to see. The Task Force hoped to encounter a similar sentiment in the mostly Sunni citizens of the Tikrit region.
Task Force Tripoli’s organization for combat was unique in a number of ways. First, the Task Force headquarters was formed using the Division Forward CP as a nucleus. Over the many months of rehearsals, operations and planning, only minor changes had been required to the organization of the Forward CP. The Division Forward headquarters had been scaled to be closer to a brigade-sized headquarters rather than one built for division-sized operations. With a relatively small footprint, the Forward CP configuration was still a fully functional Division Headquarters, with the robust command and control required for this long-range operation. More importantly, however, was Task Force Tripoli’s integration of three Light Armored Reconnaissance battalions working under a single commander. Under General Kelly (himself a former LAR battalion commander), Tripoli was, in effect, an LAR Regiment. The 'Task Force' was formed by reinforcing this core with its own CSS element, a company of truck-mobile infantry, combat engineers, and an artillery battalion (5/11) augmented with a target processing section and counterbattery radars. This proved the perfect combination of speed, sustainability, and lethality for this mission.
Tripoli launched its attack during the afternoon hours of 12 April. As the sun was going down, Task Force Tripoli approached the Al Swash bridge over the Tigris River, the same bridge that G/2/5 had fought its way across only hours previously. It was a very long but narrow bridge, with steep approaches on both banks. The approach to the bridge and passage through the small village of Al-Swash along the Tigris River was a surreal experience that none of the members of the Task Force would forget. The long columns of Task Force vehicles snaked through the tiny village, in many places squeezing between houses with barely room to spare on either side. The village had electricity, and in the dimly lit streets, houses, and cafes, the population turned out to welcome the Marines and wish them good luck. Many in the cheering crowd passed out candied dates and cold soda. Families with children lined every doorway and sidewalk, shouting "Hello", "George Bush good", and "What is your name?" The same phrases had been heard throughout the operation from An Nasiriyah to Baghdad, but in the surreal quiet of this recently liberated village along the Tigris, the words seemed to be shouted with a special enthusiasm. The local citizens had seen the reaction of the Marines to the presence of the enemy, and they rejoiced that the Regime fighters on the far shore had been forced to flee.
On 13 April Task Force Tripoli entered the outskirts of Tikrit under a distinctive mural showing Saddam Hussein on horseback, valiantly leading the Iraqi army in the attack to Jerusalem. There was no doubt that Task Force Tripoli had entered ‘Saddam country’, as every light pole and signpost contained a mural of the dictator. Unlike every other area of the country, these murals and paintings had not been defaced or touched by vandals. The streets were largely empty, and there was a conspicuous absence of cheering citizens. The citizens were clearly ‘holding their breath’ to see what the arrival of the Americans would mean, both for the Regime, and themselves.
On 14 April Task Force Tripoli completed it seizure of the city and shifted to Civil Military Operations on 15 April. Blue Diamond’s OIF I major combat operations were complete and Task Force Tripoli was relieved by elements of the US Army’s 4th Infantry Division between 19-21 April.
