11th Marines OIF I
Closing in on Baghdad
THE IRAQI PLAN TO DEFEND BAGHDAD
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As the Blue Diamond prepared to assault across the Tigris and turn northwest on Highway 6 towards Baghdad the intelligence community sought to assess how Baghdad would be defended. The 1st Marine Division was deep into Iraq and once across the Tigris, Baghdad would be squarely in the Division’s cross hairs.
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From the official 1st Marine Division History:
“The Iraqi conventional resistance in the south had seemingly melted away in the face of the Division’s advance. The Fedeyeen and paramilitary threat that had replaced the conventional defense had been surprisingly vigorous, but had proven ineffective. The Iraqis had not made good use of their significant numbers of tanks and artillery systems, and had not launched the much-anticipated barrage of surface-to-surface missiles. The weakness of this response was not entirely unexpected from the two southern corps of the Iraqi Regular Army. Although the resistance in the south had been less than anticipated, even the Regime had not counted on the southern forces to put up a rigorous defense. Baghdad was expected to be a different story. Baghdad was the Regime's strategic center of gravity, and critical to Saddam's survival. Baghdad was also at the end of all lines of retreat for Iraqi forces that had withdrawn in the face of the US 3d Infantry Division or the 1st Marine Division advances. Whatever forces the Regime had left were now reinforcing the capitol defenses.
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The intelligence reporting continued to assess that the Iraqi strategy was to ‘circle the wagons’ around Baghdad and Tikrit. The Republican Guard (RG) was expected to defend the capitol in a series of concentric defensive rings. The outer ring would be established by the RG, defending in depth in a series of supplementary positions 25-60 km from the city. Inside that ring, the Fedeyeen and paramilitary forces were expected to establish an urban-centric defense in the capitol itself. Inside this defense would be a third ring of defense, composed of the Special Republican Guard and Iraqi Intelligence Service troops. These would be the last holdouts, defending Saddam Hussein and his sons to their final deaths in the palaces of Baghdad. In the international media, the Iraqis claimed that they would draw the Americans into the city, where the US technological advantage would be diminished. The Iraqis had visions of posing a ‘Chechnya’ or ‘Stalingrad’ problem to the Coalition in the suburbs and streets of Baghdad.
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Allegedly, the defense of Baghdad would also entail the free and liberal use of chemical agents on the battlefield. If the Iraqis had this capability, there did not seem to be a deterrent to their use at this late stage in the fight. There was no more diplomatic leverage to be gained, and the presence of ‘infidel’ invaders on the holy ground of Iraq might actually gain some sympathy for the Iraqis in the Arab press. The use of chemicals, moreover, would probably not be restricted to use against attacking US forces. Missile strikes on Israel, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and southern Iraqi cities under Coalition control were considered possible.
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The Division began to question this assessment as it crossed the Tigris River. The Baghdad Republican Guard Division had certainly not posed the significant challenge it had been expected to. Many of the defenders had adopted the same civilian-clothes strategy of their brothers in the south, making it easy for them to fade into the civilian populace as their military situation became untenable. The Baghdad RG Division had also been the subject of hundreds of sorties by Coalition aircraft, and had been largely disabled by air fires. Most identifiable armor or artillery targets had been destroyed. Without their combined arms, the infantry did not possess the combat power required to defend the city. The only strategy left to the Baghdad RG Division had been to fade into the urban area, and defend as irregulars. Would the same model hold true for the Baghdad defenders? “
With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003
1 APRIL 2003 – CROSSING THE SADDAM CANAL.
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On March 31, 2003 the 1st Marine Division continued its attack and seized the Hantush Airfield and then turned west to attack along Highway 27 to bypass the Baghdad Republican Guard Division in Al Kut and seize crossings across the Tigris River.
Regimental Frag Order 25-03 described the Cannon Cockers’ plan to support the Division attack:
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2. Mission. On order, 11th Marines supports the 1st MARDIV assault across the Tigris River. On order, we will support the Division’s attack in zone to destroy the remaining regular and irregular Iraqi forces IVO Baghdad in order to facilitate regime removal.
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3.b. Concept of Operations. As the Division advances towards the Tigris River, 11th Marines will support its movement along Highway 1 with continuous fire support and be in position to mass fires in support of the crossing of the Saddam Canal and Tigris River.
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On April 1st the Division attacked along Highway 27 and crossed the Saddam Canal with RCT-5 in the lead and 11th Marines units close behind. The RCT-5 attack was supported by 2/11 in Direct Support and 5/11 providing General Support Reinforcing fires to 2/11. The performance of 2/11 and 5/11 on that day is captured in the Division’s official history:
“The artillery performed magnificently during the attacks up route 27. The Cannon Cockers from 2/11 reinforced by 5/11, set a standard of impressive performance (here and throughout the campaign). Terrain was extremely constricted, but somehow the artillerymen were always able to get into firing positions.” With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003.
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The accompanying video clip shows R 5/10 (attached to 5/11) pounding Iraqi positions. Note the other firing battery moving by with speed on its way to its next firing position. This leapfrogging of firing units allowed the Cannon Cockers to maintain continuous support during the rapid advance.
(Video – SgtMaj J. Racine. Music – “Obliteration” Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons)
R 5/10 helps pave the way for crossing the Saddam Canal.
2 APRIL 2003 – MEANWHILE BACK AT HOME
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While the Cannon Cockers were preparing for the final push on Baghdad, John Burnett of National Public Radio (NPR) was reporting on the role that artillery was going to play in the upcoming fight.
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This piece of reporting on the gunners of R 5/10, attached to 5/11, does a superb job of describing life on the gun line and how a fire mission is executed. There are some minor factual errors that only artillerymen will catch, but they don’t detract from the overall story.
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When NPR predicted that artillery would play a bigger role in the upcoming fight, little did they know how soon those words would ring true.
NPR reports on the King of Battle.
3 APRIL 2003 – THE RACE TO BAGHDAD IS ON
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In the early morning of 3 April, RCT-5 moved into the attack. To the rear of the westward-facing columns, artillery made a dull racket as two battalions of the 11th Marines sent volley after volley east toward Al Kut in support of RCT-7’s main effort attack.
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April 3rd presented unique challenges to the Cannon Cockers and the Regiment ratcheted its performance up a notch in response. The day started with the Regiment sounding reveille on the Baghdad Republican Guard Division in Al Kut with a two battalion schedule of fires as the 1st Marine Division continued its attack to fix the remnants of the enemy in place while the Division main effort crossed the Tigris River and swung to the northwest and Baghdad.
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As noted in the Division’s official history:
“To support the Division through this complex battlefield maneuver, 11th Marines had adroitly changed the missions of firing battalions to match the shifts in direction and status of the main effort. To support RCT-5, 2/11 was in DS with 5/11 GSR to 2/11 and 3/11 in GS. To support RCT-7 when it became the main effort, 3/11 was shifted to DS, with 5/11 GSR to 3/11. The 11th Marines fires professionals smoothly made the transitions in fires control without disrupting supporting fires to either attack. Finally, 11th Marines fired disengagement fires and all three prongs of the Al Kut attack disengaged.” With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003
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The Division’s plan for a two pronged attack parallel attack along the north and south banks of the Tigris River changed in the afternoon when the lead elements of RCT-5 reached Al Aziziyah and found that the captured pontoon bridge there was incapable of supporting the RCT’s armor and heavy equipment. Instead of continuing the attack along the south bank or emplacing a new bridge, RCT-5 and 2/11 were ordered to return to An Numaniyah and cross the Tigris at the bridges there. When this change in the scheme of maneuver unfolded, 5/11 and 3/11 showed the inherent flexibility of the artillery by providing continuous support to the 5th Marine’s units on the north side of the Tigris.
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As the 1st Marine Division began its move on Baghdad, RCT-1 and 1/11 began an epic 200 km road march to rejoin the Division. They would complete the move in less than 24 hours and rejoin the Division on the outskirts of Baghdad on April 4th.
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The accompanying video clip shows T 5/11 in action on the morning of 3 April as the Cannon Cockers engage the remnants of the Baghdad Republican Guard Division with two battalions (3/11 and 5/11). The action quickly shifts to the north as 5/11 crosses the Tigris River at An Numaniyah. Elements of the 11th Marines would cross the Tigris at the bridge shown in the video and a pontoon bridge placed by Engineer Support Battalion to the west.
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As the long day drew to a close, Baghdad was in the Blue Diamond's crosshairs.
(Video – SgtMaj J. Racine. Music – “I Can Feel It Coming” Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons)
T 5/11 pounds the Baghdad Republican Guard Division around Al Kut.
4 APRIL 2003, THE CANNON COCKERS UNLEASH HELL
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Everyone who participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom I has their own “unforgettable moment.” Collectively, most of the Cannon Cockers of the 11th Marines will never forget the sights and sounds of the afternoon and evening of April 4th when the Regiment fired four massed fire missions with all 72 howitzers.
The morning of the 4th marked the beginning of the Division’s final push to Baghdad. The Cannon Cockers kicked off the morning with 3/11 and 5/11 executing a two battalion schedule of fires to support RCT-5’s attack. Anticipating a rapid advance, 2/11 was integrated into the RCT-5 column to allow the Battalion to rapidly displace forward and establish firing positions to extend the range of supporting artillery fires. Working closely with RCT-5, the 11th Marines coordinated its sequence of movement to ensure continuous support to the advance. As captured in Regimental Frag Order 30, the planned order of march was:
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2nd Tanks with attached infantry from 2/5, E Btry, 2/11 Jump Command Post (CP),
3/5, K Btry, 2/11 Main CP, 11th Marines Forward CP, 5/11 Advance Parties, 3/11 Advance Parties,
1/5, 5/11, 3/11, 11th Marines Regimental Trains
As RCT-5 attacked up Highway 6 they encountered a mix of regular Al Nida Republican Guard units and irregulars clad in black uniforms and non-military attire. When the lead elements of RCT-5 approached to within a few km of Baghdad, the enemy set fire trenches adjacent to the road ablaze, making visibility extremely difficult. At this point in the battle the fog of war began to thicken. The intersection of Highway 6 and Route Green (the route leading north to the battalion’s objective) was known as the 'Diyala Crossroads'. With plenty of aggressive enemy still anxious to fight, 3/5 was ordered to clear both roadsides.
While 3/5 worked to clear out a tenacious group of foreign jihadis, Highway 6 took on the look of a Southern California freeway at rush hour. The long Division column ground to a halt and, anticipating the fight, 11th Marines units quickly emplaced on any available piece of terrain. The stop allowed 1/11 to close on the Regiment and establish firing positions. The entire Regiment was ready to join the fight and the call soon came.
When 3/5 encountered stiffening resistance, the 3/5 Commander ordered his lead platoon to pull back to a covered position and he called for artillery to pound the enemy position.
For the first time in combat since the Korean War 50 years prior, the 11th Marine Regimental Collective Call Sign went out over the Regimental Fire Direction Radio Net calling for a four battalion regimental massed fire mission to support 3/5.
The results of the mission are recorded in the Division’s official history:
“The display that followed was a sight to behold. Back to back battalion volleys that lasted for 10 minutes or more caused the earth to shake and lifted a pall of smoke that lasted for several hours. Because the Marines had pulled back to a covered position, 3/5 was able to direct this devastating fire within danger close ranges and right on top of the enemy positions. Afterward, India Company reported that the effects of the fires had left the jihadis shattered and bloody.” With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003.
The accompanying video captures the 11th Marine Regiment massing its 72 howitzers on the afternoon and evening of April 4th. The tight positions and close proximity of firing units is readily visible in the video as the camera spins to capture the numerous batteries engaged in the mission. While the video captures some of the sights, it in no way captures the noise and shock waves that were associated with the firing of 72 howitzers in a confined area.
No one who was there will ever forget it.
Video – SgtMaj J. Racine
The 11th Marines masses its 72 howitzers in support of 3/5.
4/5 APRIL 2003 – THE NIGHT OF THE CANNON COCKERS
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After punishing the enemy in front of 3/5 in the afternoon, the 11th Marines were called on to support the night shift. Taking advantage of the close proximity of all its Battalions, the Regiment fired through the night and massed the Regiment twice.
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With over 140,000 views on You Tube, a version of the accompanying video may be the most viewed and famous video of OIF I. Quick thinking in the B 1/11 position captured a Regimental mass fire mission on an Iraqi mechanized infantry unit with BBDPICM from a video camera looking through a set of Night Vision Goggles (NVGs).
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While many have viewed a version of this video on You Tube, the accompanying comments are also worth a look.
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A favorite from “Iranian Mujahid:”
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“A defenseless country with its ill equipped army was targeted like this. It was just one sided fight.”
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What were you expecting, pin pricks?
Regimental 5, BBDPICM, destroys an Iraqi Mech Infantry unit.
4 APRIL 2003 – MEANWHILE BACK AT HOME
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The Cannon Cockers support to the final push on Baghdad and the unrelenting punishment of Iraqi forces did not go unnoticed by the embedded media. The sounds of the guns of the 11th Marines provided the intro for John Burnett of National Public Radio (NPR) as he reported on the “massive U.S. artillery barrage” and “American onslaught” he witnessed.